- Additional Authors
- EBSCOhost
- Description
- 1 online resource.
- Subject
- Bibliography (note)
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Reproduction (note)
- Source of Description (note)
- Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on September 19, 2022).
- Contents
- Acknowledgements -- 1. The Scope and Aims of This Book: Properties, Laws, and Dispositions -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism -- 1.2.1 Properties and Predicates -- 1.2.2 Qualities and Dispositions -- 1.2.3 Existence, Actuality, and Realization -- 1.2.4 Metaphysical Grounding -- 1.2.5 Grounding as a Worldly Relationship -- 1.2.6 Grounding Does Not Entail Reduction -- 1.2.7 Grounding Occurs with Metaphysical Necessity -- 1.2.8 Ground, Necessity, and Essence -- 1.2.9 The Methodology of Ground Theorizing -- 1.3 The Rival Approaches to Natural Modality -- 1.3.1 The Mosaic View -- 1.3.2 The Law-Driven Account -- 1.3.3 Property-Driven Approaches to Natural Modality -- 1.4 Modal Platonism in More Detail -- 1.4.1 Defending Platonism -- 1.4.2 The Grounding Theory of Natural Modality -- 1.5 The Big Picture -- PART I. THE CORE THEORY: MODAL PLATONISM -- 2. The Platonic Theory of Dispositional Directedness -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Two Metaphysical Principles about Dispositions -- 2.3 Properties as Tropes or Universals? -- 2.4 The Aristotelian versus Platonic View of Universals -- 2.5 Alternative Accounts of Dispositional Directedness -- 2.5.1 Manifestations as Parts: The Conjunctive Property Proposal -- 2.5.2 Manifestations as Structural Constituents: The Diachronic Property Proposal -- 2.5.3 Directedness as a Higher-Order Monadic Property -- 2.6 Conclusions -- 3. Against Dispositional Essentialism: A Grounding Theory of Natural Modality -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Two Kinds of Internal Relation -- 3.3 Against the Bradlean Conception of Dispositional Directedness -- 3.4 Jaag's Formulation of the Problem Facing Dispositional Essentialism -- 3.5 The Leibnizian Approach: Universals as Qualities Which Ground Natural Modality -- 3.6 The Logical Form of Dispositional Predication -- 3.7 Comparison with Other Theories of Dispositions -- 3.8 Conclusions -- 4. Solving the Entailment and Governance Problems -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Entailment Problem -- 4.3 What Second-Order Law Statements Do Not Entail -- 4.4 What Second-Order Law Statements Do Entail -- 4.5 Does the Reverse Entailment Hold? -- 4.6 The Question of Governance -- 4.7 Why Leibnizian Relations of Directedness Do Not Govern -- 5. Dissolving the Problem of Latent Dispositions -- 5.1 Introduction: The Problem of Latent Dispositions -- 5.2 Mumford's and Bird's Dispositionalist Accounts of Latent Dispositions -- 5.3 Identity Theory to the Rescue? -- 5.4 Psillos's Regress Problem -- 5.5 Marmodoro's Pure Powers Response -- 5.6 Bauer's Pure Powers Response -- 5.7 Conclusions -- 6. Objections and Replies.
- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Really Realist? -- 6.3 Multiple Realization? -- 6.4 Act of Faith? -- 6.5 Humean? -- 6.6 Can Qualities Explain Dispositions? -- 6.7 Meta-Grounding? -- 6.8 Exclusion Problem? -- 6.9 Qualities Collapse into Powers? -- 6.10 Why Not Tropes? -- 6.11 What Is Directedness? -- 6.12 Not Naturalistic? -- 6.13 Un-Eleatic? -- 7. Instantiation and Repeatability: A Platonic Approach -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Explanatory Instability of Aristotelianism -- 7.3 The Explanatory Role of Platonic Universals: A Traditional View of Instantiation -- 7.4 Is There a Simpler Explanation? -- 7.5 Armstrong's Aristotelian Account of Instantiation and One over Many -- 7.6 Conclusions -- 8. Probabilistic Laws -- 8.1 Introduction: Laws and Probabilistic Strength -- 8.2 Armstrong on Irreducible Probabilistic Laws -- 8.3 Resisting Probabilistic Causation -- 8.4 Armstrong's Preferred Account -- 8.5 The Problem of Probabilistic Failures -- 8.6 The Merits of Modal Platonism -- 8.7 Further Considerations: Van Fraassen's Criticisms of Armstrong's Probabilistic Laws -- 8.8 Conclusions -- 9. Determinable Laws -- 9.1 Introduction: The Challenge of Accounting for Functional Laws -- 9.2 The Problem of Functional Laws in More Detail -- 9.3 Determinable Laws -- 9.4 The Overdetermination Problem -- 9.5 Solving the Overdetermination Problem -- 9.6 Conclusions -- 10. Extending Modal Platonism -- 10.1 Introduction: Modality in General -- 10.2 Non-Natural Modality -- 10.3 Possibility and Necessity: Platonism versus the Dominant Possible-Worlds Approach -- 10.4 The Richness of Modal Platonism -- 10.5 Platonic Modal Relations -- 10.6 Modal Platonism and the Argument from Unrealized Possibility -- 10.7 Alien Possibility and Natural Science -- 10.8 Further Work -- 10.9 Conclusions -- 11. Summary -- Appendix I: Logical Proofs of Chapter 4 -- References -- Index of Names -- Index of Concepts.
- ISBN
- OCLC
- om2087638405
- Author
Tugby, Matthew, author.
- Title
Putting properties first : a platonic metaphysics for natural modality / Matthew Tugby.
- Publisher
Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2022.
- Copyright Date
©2022
- Edition
First edition.
- Type of Content
text
- Type of Medium
computer
- Type of Carrier
online resource
- Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Reproduction
Electronic reproduction. Ipswich, MA Available via World Wide Web.
- Note
Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on September 19, 2022).
- Connect to:
- Added Author
EBSCOhost
- Other Form:
Print version: Putting properties first : a platonic metaphysics for natural modality. First edition. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022 9780198855101 (DLC) 2021953512